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ANALYZING THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN
REFORM ACT OF 2002
REMARKS OF ROY SCHOTLAND*

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") 1 is the
laboratory in campaign finance law. When analyzing BCRA, it is important
to look at the Missouri state law that led to the Supreme Court case, Nixon
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. 2 In Shrink Missouri, five justices
upheld Missouri's relatively low simple limit on contributions to
candidates. The law in Missouri limited contributions by anyone to
candidates, but there was no limit as to how much a person or entity could
give to a political party committee or to a political action committee (PAC).
Further, there was no limit on how much a committee could give to another
committee or any limits on contributions or spending by corporations,
unions, or PACs.
One exception existed to the Shrink Missouri law. A party committee
could give ten times the limit, plus another ten times the limit in-kind. It is
justifiable that these separate treatments existed for entities rather than for
individuals, as entities are different than people. However, the different
rules for party committees present some problems because there are so
many party committees. With Missouri's system, every party committee in
the state could arguably give an unlimited amount to a candidate and such a
system favors incumbents. For proof that this system favors incumbents,
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I. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. \07-155, 116 Stat. 81 (to be
codified at 2 U.S.c. § 431 et seq.).
2. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
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one need only look to statistics: Missouri hes the tenth highest incumbent
reelection rate for its legislators in the nation.
Reform needs to take place so that incumbents are not favored and so
challengers get the funds needed to compete against incumbents. BCRA is
one such reform tool that is designed to help balance the playing field
between incumbents and new candidates.
With regard to BCRA's effect on state campaign finance law, there are
two important aspects: (1) disclosure and (2) appropriation of funds. With
regard to the first, online Internet reports offer the public a tremendous
amount of raw data. A person may log onto the Internet and search through
a database of candidate information. The database is so massive, however,
that if your interest is anything other than finding out what Ken Gross or
Trevor Potter filed about their own campaigns, forget it. The database's
large volume of information makes it extremely difficult to find necessary
information.
The second important aspect of BCRA' s effect on state campaign
finance law is the appropriation of funds. This aspect is best seen in one of
my favorite stunts in campaign finance. Joe Bruno, of the New York State
Senate, supported campaign finance disclosure online and proposed to
appropriate $10,000 to accomplish it. When Bruno first announced his
ideas, he got a lot of good ink out of the first time; the second time, of
course, never caught up. The dominate theme of Bruno's story is SHAM,
as seen in the McConnell v. F.E. C. 3 case, which focuses on the level-down
approach.
The "level-down" approach is trying to dam or bottle-up the money and
it simply will not work. As David Broder stated: The question is whether
the limited purifying effects of a law like BCRA are worth the restrictions.
Justice Scalia contends that BCRA is not worth the restrictions; the juice is
not worth the squeeze. Justice Breyer, in Missouri Shrink,4 agreed with
Scalia's statement in McConnell. 5 Justice Breyer stated, "Where a law
significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in
complex ways, the law closely scrutinizes the statute's impacts on those
interests, but refrains from employing a simple test. Rather, it balances
interests. In practice, this is asking whether the statute burdens anyone
such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects
upon the other interests at stake. I believe that Justice Breyer should have
restated this opinion in McConnell because that case dealt with similar
Issues.

3. 540 U.S. 93,124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
4. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 377.
5. 540 U.S. at _,124 S. Ct. at 619.
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Laws like BCRA are complex and have both posItive and negative
impacts. The negative aspects of BCRA, however, are daunting and far
outweigh the benefits. For example, BCRA significantly increases the
incumbent's advantage because a key source of support for challengers is
party money and BCRA diminishes party money. Any adjustments made
to fix this negative impact will not likely make up what the challengers
lose.
One provision that deals with the incumbent's money is the new
"millionaire's amendment," 6 which will be receive more visibility soon.
This new amendment allows someone opposed by a deep-pocket candidate
to get much higher hard money contributions. This new amendment,
however, is not the "millionaire's amendment," but rather the "antimillionaire's amendment" or the "pro-incumbent amendment." As John
McCain stated, "We wake up in the middle of the night worrying that some
heir or heiress will come after us."
Besides the "millionaire's amendment," many other provisions exist that
will aid an incumbent. One example is found in the candidacy of Tom
DeLay. In November 2003, DeLay sent out invitations to potential donors
for the 2004 Republican National Convention, which will take place in
August 2004, in New York City. The invitations asked potential donors to
give as much as $500,000 for "face time" with DeLay and other VIPS
during the convention. The New York Times donned the package the
"Upper East Side Package." The donations that DeLay solicited did not go
to DeLay. Rather, the donations went to a charity, "Celebrations for
Children." Off the top of the donations, DeLay deducted the expenses
from the convention events, which could have been 80 to 90 percent. The
rest of the money, 10 to 20 percent, went to the 501(c)(3) charity.
BCRA attacks plans like DeLay's that try to maneuver around BCRA.
BCRA is designed to reduce preferential access, but such access still
occurs. For example, BCRA specifically authorizes candidates or federal
officials to raise money for charities. BCRA explicitly states that the
charity does not have to be in existence; the charity need only have
submitted an application for tax-exempt status. If the charity'S application
does not go through, of course, then there will not be tax deductibility.
There is, however, every reason to think that these applications will go
through, which means the person making the contribution will get the
benefit of tax deductions for at least most of the contributions. And
6. See Increased Contribution and Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits for
Candidates Opposing Self-Financed Candidates (Millionaires' Amendment) (Jan. 24,2003),
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/pdflnprmlmillionaire_amendlfr68nOI7p03969.pdf
(detailing the Federal Election Commission's interim rules for the Millionaire's
Amendment).
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although the candidate does not get the money that is donated to the
charity, they get the publicity in their hometown of donating enormous
amounts towards a charity; the candidate receives positive publicity. A few
years of helping the charity and enjoying that spotlight will build as much
support as substantial sums into the c:ampaign. BCRA is supposed to
reduce preferential access, but it specifically states that candidates should
raise money for charities, which helps incumbents.
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